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Abstract
The Doha Ministerial Declaration emphasized that priority should be given to improving
market access for products originating in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In this
paper, we analyze the importance of this proposition with respect to market access in the
Triad economies. We first present a brief history of non-reciprocal preferences granted by
the Triad. This covers Generalized System of Preference (GSP) programmes in each, and
further preferences granted to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries by the EU and
preferences granted to Caribbean Basin, Andean, and African countries by the US. This
history is followed by an assessment of trade generated by these preferences in the year
2000, and of the extent to which LDC exports might be expected to increase should the
preferences be made comprehensive. Preferences in 2000 are shown to have led to an
increase of US$3.5 billion in LDC exports, while a complete duty-free treatment could
expand LDC exports by as much as US$7.6 billion, 90 per cent of which will be absorbed
by the US. As this represents a doubling of LDC exports to these countries, we interpret
these results as an endorsement of this priority in the Doha Round of negotiations.
Keywords: Least Developed Countries, Generalized System of Preferences, Doha Round
JEL Classification: F1, F13, F14, F17, O1The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Janis Vehmaan-Kreula at UNU/WIDER
Printed at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of
any of the views expressed.
ISSN 1609-5774
ISBN 92-9190-478-3 (printed publication)
ISBN 92-9190-479-1 (internet publication)
Acknowledgements
The authors thank participants at a UNU/WIDER project meeting for useful comments,
project director Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis for initial feedback on the project, and Eli
Miloslavsky for research assistance.1
1 Introduction
In the work programme laid out by the Doha Ministerial Declaration of 20 November
2001 (World Trade Organization 2001), the assembled trade representatives committed
themselves ‘to the objective of duty-free, quota-free market access for products
originating from LDCs (Least Developed Countries)’.1 Through a large number of
programmes, the Triad economies of the European Union (EU), Japan, and the United
States (US) already offer broad duty-free and preferential treatment to developing
countries. Some, such as the Generalized System of Preferences programme, are
decades old. Others, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act of the United
States, the Everything But Arms Initiative of the European Union, and the 99 Per cent
Initiative of Japan, are just getting started.
The drive to grant substantial trade preferences to the LDCs, however, is relatively new.
While there is no formal system for identifying countries as ‘developing’, the ‘least
developed countries’ are selected by the United Nations Economic and Social Council
based on a number of criteria and confirmed by a vote of the UN General Assembly.
First created in 1971, the list is updated every three years, and there are now 49 UN-
designated LDCs.
An initiative to improve market access for the LDCs was broached in the World Trade
Organization’s Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 1996.2 At the WTO’s Seattle
Ministerial of 1998, the EU formally proposed duty-free access for essentially all LDC
exports. This and other efforts resulted in the Doha commitment.
This paper will confront the Doha commitment directly by investigating episodes of
unilateral trade liberalization for goods of poor countries and projecting the effect on
LDC exports were the Triad economies to eliminate tariffs on all LDC goods. A
companion paper characterizes the duty and quota barriers that currently face the poor
countries of the world.3
To understand trade liberalization and changing trade patterns, the paper will describe
the programmes previously instituted by the Triad to ease restrictions on trade of the
poorest countries, provide formal estimates of the effect of these programmes, and then
project the effect of moving to a zero-tariff world for LDC goods. Examples of previous
programmes include the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), offered by all three
Triad economies; the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), the Andean Trade Preferences Act
(ATPA), and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), offered by the US; and
successive iterations of benefits for former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the
Pacific (ACP), offered by the EU. Table 1 shows programmes uniquely offered by the
US and the EU.
                                                
1 Paragraph 42, page 9. Available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm or
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf.
2 Inama et al. (2001).
3 Haveman and Shatz (2003).2
Table 1
US and EU preference programmes
A. Preference programmes of the US
Programme Relevant dates
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
(Caribbean Basin Initiative)
Enacted 5 August 1983, extended and
expanded in 1990. No expiration date.
Andean Trade Preference Act Enacted 4 December 1991 with expiration
set for 3 December 2001. Extended
(retroactively) and expanded in 2002
through 31 December 2006.
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act Enacted 18 May 2000. Preferences expire
30 September 2008 or with the entry into
force of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
African Growth and Opportunity Act Enacted 18 May 2000. Preferences expire
1 October 2008.
Sources: United States Congress (2000 and 2002) and United States General Accounting Office (2001).





Yaoundé I signed 1963, effective 1964.
Yaoundé II and Arusha signed 1969,
effective 1971.
ACP-EC Convention of Lomé I
ACP-EC Convention of Lomé II
ACP-EC Convention of Lomé III
ACP-EC Convention of Lomé IV
Revised Convention of Lomé IV
Lomé I signed in 1975, effective 1976-1980.
Lomé II effective 1982-1985.
Lomé III effective 1986-1990.
Lomé IV effective 1991-2000.
Revised Lomé IV amended the agreement.
ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, the ‘Cotonou
Agreement’
Signed 23 June 2000, effective 20 years.
‘Everything But Arms’ Council Regulation Effective 5 March 2001.
ACP refers to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. EC refers to the European Communities.
Sources: Agreements Office, The Council of the European Union (2003), European Union (2001),
European Union (1995-2002) and United States General Accounting Office (2001).
This paper will proceed in six sections. The next section describes the GSP, while
Section 3 discusses regional non-reciprocal Triad preference programmes. Section 4
reviews the impact of four US programmes – CBERA, CBTPA, ATPA, and AGOA –
on developing country exports. Section 5 uses econometric analysis to attack two key
questions. The first asks: How have current preference programmes affected LDC3
exports to the Triad economies? The second asks: How will LDC exports to the Triad
economies expand if all tariff barriers against them are removed? This is the heart of the
Doha proposal. Section 6 concludes.
2 The first non-reciprocal preference programme: the GSP
The GSP was proposed at the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, held in March-May 1964, and later that year a committee of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade proposed a GATT amendment to allow
members to grant trade preferences to developing countries.4 The amendment was
necessary because such a preference programme violates the GATT’s Most Favoured
Nation clause, which requires all signatory trading partners to receive benefits equal to
the most favourable benefits offered any trading partner. The amendment, known as the
enabling clause, was approved for a limited period of 10 years in 1971, giving birth to
GSP programmes, and then was made permanent in 1979. At least 18 economies
currently offer or have offered a GSP programme.5
Though helping to expand developing-country exports, the GSP has come under
criticism for a number of reasons.6 Originally, the programmes offered benefits for only
a limited range of products, and they still hold some products sacred – the EU limits
agricultural goods, the US limits textiles and apparel, and Japan limits footwear and
prepared food. Rules of origin are sometimes complex making it difficult for exporters
to meet programme requirements. The programmes also sometimes cap the quantity of
developing-country exports that can receive benefits, so it is possible for a country to be
too successful. Finally, there is some evidence that such unilateral preference
programmes stunt trade liberalization in developing countries themselves.7
The GSP in the Triad
The US first approved a GSP programme in the Trade Act of 1974 with the programme
taking effect on 1 January 1976. It was to last only until 1985, but remains in place
today. In their reports on the bill, both the US House of Representatives and the US
Senate said they instituted the programme to enhance economic development, economic
diversification, and exports of less developed countries.8 Benefits included duty-free
treatment for designated commodities and designated countries.
                                                
4 United States International Trade Commission, Office of Industries and Office of Economic Research
(1978).
5 The earliest such preference programmes actually were offered well before the passage of the enabling
clause – by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1965 and by Australia in 1966. Australia gained
a GATT waiver for its programme (US International Trade Commission 1978).
6 Inama et al. (2001).
7 Özden and Reinhardt (2002).
8 United States International Trade Commission, Office of Industries and Office of Economic Research
(1978).4
The commodity list set the standard for future US trade programmes until the Trade and
Development Act of 2000 (discussed in Section 3). In particular, it excluded certain
textile and apparel items, watches, import-sensitive electronic items, import-sensitive
steel products, some footwear, and import-sensitive glass products.9 It also established
competitive need limits, under which a product from a particular country would come
off the GSP list if its exports to the US hit a certain value. The initial beneficiary list
included 98 independent countries and 40 non-independent countries and territories,
among which were 26 of the 27 then-UN-designated LDC, excluding Uganda.10
However, the initial programme contained no special benefits for the LDCs.
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 authorized the president to waive competitive needs
limits on LDCs, known under US trade law as least developed beneficiary developing
countries. In 1985 President Reagan designated 32 such countries in 1985 – most, but
not all of the UN-designated LDCs. LDCs gained more benefits in 1997 when President
Clinton named about 1,770 additional items duty free exclusively for them.
Under the rules of its GSP, the US can exclude countries on a number of grounds, such
as having a communist government, harbouring terrorists, or belonging to an
organization that withholds vital supplies from the world economy. This has led to the
exclusion of LDCs at times, including Afghanistan in 1980 and the Central African
Republic and Myanmar in 1989. Laos and Sudan are among those currently excluded.
The European Union (then the European Economic Community) was the first economy
to implement a GSP after approval of the GATT enabling clause. Unlike the US
programme, the EU programme does not offer duty-free market access on all goods.
Instead, the programme in its current revision designates goods as non-sensitive and
sensitive, the latter of which compete more directly with European producers. Non-
sensitive goods enter at zero duty, while sensitive goods enter at reduced duty compared
to the MFN rate.11 While not all GSP products enter duty free, the EU eliminated
quotas and quantitative restrictions on these products in 1995.
The EU GSP provided more favourable treatment for LDCs from the beginning. It now
offers more favourable benefits to a number of different types of countries based on
promotion of labour rights, protection of tropical forests, or combating of drug
production and trafficking. The most favourable arrangements are reserved for LDCs.
The EU has expanded benefits for LDCs over at least the last three revisions of its
programme. In each case, the benefits apply to all UN-designated LDCs. The latest
expansion is the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, effective 1 March 2001, in
which the EU allows duty-free and quota-free access to all products except arms and
ammunition. Bananas, rice, and sugar are also excluded, though trade in these three
goods is to be liberalized in stages by the end of 2009.12 Rules of origin,
                                                
9 United States International Trade Commission, Office of Industries and Office of Economic Research
(1978: 7).
10 Executive Order No. 11888, 24 November 1975 (United States International Trade Commission,
Office of Industries and Office of Economic Research, 1978: 8-9).
11 European Union (1999 and 2002).
12 Council Regulation 416/2001 (European Union 2001a and 2001b).5
documentation, and other requirements of the GSP programme still apply, though unlike
other GSP benefits, the EBA programme has no expiration date.
Japan first offered its GSP in 1971 for 10 years and has since extended it through
2011.13 The current iteration of the programme offers benefits on a positive list of 226
agricultural products and all industrial products except for a negative list of 105 items.
Tariffs on agricultural products range from zero to a reduction of the MFN rate, while
tariffs on industrial products are zero except for items designated sensitive. These items
have a value or quantity ceiling, and tariffs are zero or a reduction of the MFN rate.14
The programme as of April 2002 includes 149 countries and 15 territories and grants
LDC benefits to all but three of the 49 UN-designated LDCs – Comoros and Djibouti
are not in the programme and Japan does not designate Zambia as an LDC for GSP
purposes.
Japan was early in giving special benefits to LDCs, extending special preferences in
April 1980. Special benefits include duty-free treatment to all products covered by the
GSP and the elimination of import ceilings. As of 1 April 2001, Japan went even further
with its 99 Per cent Initiative, in which it added about 360 items duty-free and quota-
free to the GSP list exclusively for LDCs.15 New products include all textile and
apparel items. By the estimate of the Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry, this
increased to 99 per cent (from around 94 per cent) the share of industrial products
granted duty-free, quota-free access from LDCs. Furthermore, the initiative covered all
UN-designated LDCs, including those not in the regular GSP programme.16
3 Regional non-reciprocal preference programmes of the Triad
3.1 Programmes of the US
The oldest region-specific unilateral preference programme of the US is the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), passed in 1983 and popularly known as the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Since then, the US added the Andean Trade
Preferences Act in 1991 (ATPA), and in 2000, the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership
Act (CBTPA) and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
                                                
13 Customs and Tariff Bureau, Ministry of Finance (2001), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002).
14 Sensitive items include 1,181 products in 81 product groups.
15 Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry (2000) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (undated).
16 The additional countries were Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Kiribati, Tuvalu,
and Zambia.6
3.1.1 Preferences for the Caribbean17
CBERA was approved to help the region develop economically and diversify its
exports. The programme provided duty-free access for all products not specifically
excluded. However, many goods for which the Caribbean countries had a comparative
advantage were excluded, including a wide variety of footwear, textiles, and apparel.
The US amended the programme in 1990 with CBERA II, which made it permanent and
improved benefits with tariff reductions for some leather goods and duty-free treatment
on imports made completely from US components. The programme again, however,
excluded textiles and apparel.
The last change to preferential programmes for the Caribbean came with the CBTPA,
Title II of the Trade and Development Act of 2000. This programme essentially
extended benefits equivalent to the benefits Mexico gained from the reciprocal North
American Free Trade Agreement. Most importantly, the CBTPA included a range of
textile and apparel products, though with rules-of-origin requirements.
Nearly all the countries of the Caribbean, including those of Central America,
participate in the Caribbean programmes, as shown in Table 2A. The original CBERA
designated 27 countries as eligible (Aruba did not exist separately in 1983) and 24
eventually became beneficiaries. President Clinton designated the same 24 as
beneficiaries under the CBTPA.18 Haiti, the only LDC in the Western Hemisphere, has
been a beneficiary from the beginning.
3.1.2 Preferences for the Andean Nations19
ATPA was enacted on 4 December 1991 with the stated purpose of promoting
economic development and export diversification to provide alternatives to the
production of drug crops. The act provided preferences similar to those under the
CBERA, duty-free access for all products except footwear, textiles, apparel, tuna,
petroleum, watches and watch parts, and sugars and similar products, and was set to last
10 years. It was recently extended through the end of 2006, and the extension broadened
the goods eligible for preferences. Most importantly, it included apparel under certain
conditions, and tuna, though not tuna packed in cans.
The original act extended eligibility to four of the five members of the Community of
Andean Nations, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Bolivia and Colombia became
beneficiaries in 1992, and Ecuador and Peru in 1993. The bill excluded Venezuela from
eligibility, and in the run-up to renewal, both the Andean Community and the
government of Venezuela unsuccessfully sought Venezuela’s inclusion.20 None of the
beneficiaries are LDCs.
                                                
17 Much of the institutional detail described in this section is from Office of the United States Trade
Representative (1999 and 2000), and United States Congress (2000).
18 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2000).
19 Institutional background in this section is drawn largely from Office of the United States Trade
Representative (2001a).
20 Venezuela was originally excluded because the drug trade was less significant there than in the other
Andean countries, because it had a far higher per capita GDP than the other countries, and because a7
Table 2: Eligible countries for US preferences programmes
A. Caribbean trade preference eligible countries
Anguilla * Guyana





British Virgin Islands Nicaragua
Cayman Islands * Panama
Costa Rica Saint Kitts and Nevis
Dominica Saint Lucia
Dominican Republic Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
El Salvador Suriname *
Grenada Trinidad and Tobago
Guatemala Turks and Caicos Islands *
Notes: * Non-beneficiary countries. These four countries have not requested beneficiary status; countries in italics are
currently UN-designated LDCs.
Source: Office of the United States Trade Representative (1999).
B. African growth and opportunity eligible countries
Angola 2 Liberia 2
Benin Madagascar * (6 March 2001)
Botswana * (27 August 2001) Malawi * (15 August 2001)
Burkina Faso 2 Mali
Burundi 2 Mauritania
Cameroon * (1 March 2002) Mauritius * (19 January 2001)
Cape Verde Mozambique * (6 February 2002)
Central African Republic Namibia * (3 December 2001)
Chad Niger
Comoros 1 Nigeria
Republic of Congo Rwanda
Democratic Republic of Congo 2 Sao Tome and Principe
Côte d’Ivoire Senegal * (23 April 2002)
Djibouti Seychelles
Equatorial Guinea 2 Sierra Leone
Eritrea Somalia 1
Ethiopia * (2 August 2001) South Africa * (7 March 2001)
Gabon Sudan 1
Gambia 2 Swaziland * (26 July 2001)
Ghana * (20 March 2002) Tanzania * (4 February 2002)
Guinea Togo 2
Guinea-Bissau Uganda * (23 October 2001)
Kenya * (19 January 2001) Zambia * (17 December 2001)
Lesotho * (23 April 2001) Zimbabwe 2
Notes: 1 Non-beneficiary countries. These three countries have not requested beneficiary status; 2 Non-beneficiary
countries. These nine countries have been reviewed but not yet been granted beneficiary status; * Textile and apparel
beneficiary, with date of textile and beneficiary status in parentheses. Note that the implementation of beneficiary status
for Sierra Leone has been delayed pending USTR decision; Countries in italics are currently UN-designated LDCs.
Botswana was an LDC from 1971 to 1994.
Source: Office of the United States Trade Representative with the Assistance of the Trade Partnership (2000), Office of
the United States Trade Representative (2001b and 2002), and Federal Register (various issues).
                                                                                                                                              
large share of its exports to the US is petroleum, which is excluded from the act (Federal Information
Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, 1991).8
3.1.3 Preferences for Africa21
The third region to receive unilateral US preferences is Africa, under the African
Growth and Opportunity Act, Title I of the Trade and Development Act of 2000. AGOA
sets a new standard for US programmes in several different ways. First, it locks in GSP
preferences for beneficiary countries for eight years. Otherwise, GSP preferences are
renewed annually. It also adds 1,835 new products to the GSP list especially for AGOA
beneficiaries. In addition, it removes the competitive needs limits that apply throughout
the GSP programme. Finally, it includes benefits for textiles and apparel, provided
beneficiaries show they have procedures in place to prevent transshipments and meet
rules-of-origin requirements, creating two tiers of beneficiaries.
The law named all sub-Saharan African countries as eligible, and 34 became
beneficiaries on 2 October 2000. Table 2B shows eligible countries and their
beneficiary status. In 2001, the first full year of the programme’s operation, 11 countries
were named textile and apparel beneficiaries, with at least five more named in 2002.
In the Caribbean and Andean programmes, all eligible countries that requested
beneficiary status eventually gained it. This is not so in the Africa programme. As with
all unilateral US programmes, eligible countries must request beneficiary status and
must fulfill certain requirements, such as making progress toward establishing or having
established a market-based economy, having policies to reduce poverty, combat
corruption, and protect worker rights, and helping combat terrorism.22 Accordingly,
only 22 of the 34 UN-designated African LDCs currently receive AGOA benefits. Of
these, nine have gained textile and apparel benefits.
3.2 Programmes of the EU
The EU has provided preferences to its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and
the Pacific (ACP) almost since the beginning of its formation. These efforts have
included two Yaoundé Conventions, the Arusha Convention, four Lomé Conventions
and now the Cotonou Agreement.23 As these agreements evolved, they included some
and then all ACP LDCs, but never any Asian LDCs. The final Lomé Accord included
all ACP LDCs for the first time.
Yaoundé I and II in 1963 and 1969, respectively, between the European Economic
Community (EEC) and former African colonies gave commercial advantages on
industrial items along with financial assistance. Arusha in 1969 gave separate benefits
to three East African states, all previously under British rule or administration.
                                                
21 Institutional background for this section is drawn from United States Congress (2000); Office of the
United States Trade Representative with the Assistance of The Trade Partnership (2000); United
States Customs Service (2001); and Office of the United States Trade Representative (2001b and
2002).
22 Office of the United States Trade Representative with the Assistance of the Trade Partnership (2000:
20-23).
23 Much of this material is from European Union (undated), along with European Centre for
Development Policy Management (2001a and 2001b).9
The accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC in 1973 led to the Lomé Convention
(Lomé I) of 1975, which expanded membership to African and Caribbean former
British colonies. In addition to preferences that made almost all exports duty-free, the
Convention included a commodity export earnings stabilization scheme known as
STABEX. Though agreed to by the GATT, there was some feeling among GATT
members that the ACP trade preferences were not entirely GATT-legal. These concerns
continued throughout the life of the Lomé Conventions.24 Lomé II, signed in 1979 and
effective in 1981, added a new system for ACP mineral and mining exports, known as
SYSMIN. Lomé III, signed in 1984 and effective 1986, and Lomé IV, signed December
1989 and updated mid-term in 1995, broadened country coverage.
The newest agreement, the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, also known as the Cotonou
Agreement, represents a significant break with the unilateral preferences of the past.25
Faced with issues about whether preferences to the ACP nations but not to other
developing countries violate the WTO accords, the EU will phase out these preferences
and instead institute Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with different regional
groupings of the ACP countries by 2008 at the latest. These agreements effectively will
be reciprocal free trade agreements rather than unilateral preference programmes.26
The Cotonou Agreement includes 39 LDCs. They will not be affected by the
requirement for EPAs and can retain their Lomé benefits. Furthermore, under the
Everything But Arms initiative of the EU’s GSP, the LDC Cotonou signatories will
have duty free access for all products regardless of Cotonou terms.
4 US programmes and developing country export enhancement
Preference imports from developing countries comprise a small share of all US imports.
As shown in Figure 1, between 1989 and 2001, regional US programmes and the GSP
covered only 1.8 per cent to 3.8 per cent of US imports. They covered between 2.6 per
cent and 9.4 per cent of all non-dutiable imports during the same period. The trend of
the non-dutiable share has been downward since 1993, likely because of an expansion
of goods coming in duty-free from all countries as a result of the Uruguay Round
Agreements. Growth of trade under these preferences has been volatile, rising recently
with the creation of new benefits under CBTPA and AGOA, as shown in Figure 2.
                                                
24 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1977, 1983, 1989, and 1994). Under GATT rules,
preference schemes for developing countries could not discriminate against developing countries not
party to the scheme (European Centre for Development Policy Management 2001a).
25 This agreement has not yet gone permanently into effect. It needs ratification by all 15 EU members,
51 (two-thirds) of the ACP states, and the European Parliament. As of 13 September 2002, 61 ACP
countries had ratified the agreement, but only 10 EU members had. Accordingly, the ACP-EC Council
of Ministers put the agreement provisionally into force from 2 August 2000 through 1 June 2002,
subject to extension.
26 European Centre for Development Policy Management (2001b).10
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Total Preference Imports Non-Dutiable Preference Imports
ATPA New LDC 
Benefits
AGOA CBTPA
Notes: Total preference imports are shown relative to total imports, while non-dutiable preference imports
are shown relative to non-dutiable total imports. Imports are imports for consumption.
Preference Imports include all imports entering under the Generalized System of Preferences, the Andean
Trade Partnership Act (ATPA), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the Caribbean
Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Arrows show
the year each new programme started. New LDC benefits apply to the GSP programme.
Source: United States International Trade Commission (undated).
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Notes: Imports are imports for consumption. Data for each year shows the growth rate from the previous
year. For example, the figure for 1990 shows 1990 imports relative to 1989 imports.
Preference Imports include all imports entering under the Generalized System of Preferences, the Andean
Trade Partnership Act (ATPA), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the Caribbean
Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Arrows show
the year each new programme started. New LDC benefits apply to the GSP programme.
Source: United States International Trade Commission (undated).11
Among the Caribbean beneficiaries, total trade under the programmes has boomed since
1989, the first year of available data. Part A of Table 3 shows US imports from the
Caribbean beneficiary countries for 1989, 2000, and 2001. While total US imports from
the 24 countries rose more than 200 per cent between 1989 and 2001, total preference
trade – CBERA, CBTPA, and GSP – rose more than 500 per cent. For the four non-
beneficiary eligible countries, in contrast, US imports fell by almost 60 per cent during
the same period, from US$383 million to US$160 million. Much of the increase from
beneficiaries stems from the new CBTPA. Imports under this programme rose from
essentially zero in 2000 to US$5.6 billion in 2001.
Use of the CBERA and CBTPA programmes is broader on a country basis than use of
AGOA or even ATPA, as will be seen. In 2001, 9 of the 24 beneficiary countries were
each responsible for at least 1 per cent of US imports under the programme. Still, use of
the programme is quite concentrated, with the Dominican Republic and Honduras
accounting for almost 50 per cent of programme imports, as shown in Part B of Table 3.
The two largest commodities imported under the Caribbean programmes were both
apparel items, as shown in Part C of Table 3. In large part, these were not eligible for
preferences under the GSP or even CBERA. However, the new preferences did not
increase overall exports of these items much; rather, they shifted the items from dutiable
to non-dutiable or reduced-dutiable categories. Total value of these imports stayed about
steady between 2000 and 2001 while the non-dutiable value rose markedly. Despite the
apparel results, the preference programmes appear to have spurred increased imports
rather than a shift in the categorization of goods. Imports of many of the top preference
items either rose, or fell less than, total imports from beneficiaries between 2000 and
2001.
As with CBERA and CBTPA imports, ATPA imports have boomed. Table 4 shows
trade in 1991, the year before the programme started, and 2001 for the four ATPA
beneficiaries. Total imports rose 92.5 per cent, while preference imports (ATPA and
GSP) rose 278 per cent. All of this rise can be attributed to ATPA, since GSP imports
actually fell 62.5 per cent. And while some of the ATPA rise may be attributed to shifts
of products from the GSP to ATPA, this can only form a small portion. GSP trade in
1991 totalled US$492 million, while ATPA trade in 2001 totalled US$1.6 billion.
ATPA benefits are quite concentrated in the top two countries, as shown in part B of
Table 4. Colombia and Peru accounted for more than 80 per cent of all ATPA imports.
However, they also accounted for more than 80 per cent of total GDP of the four
countries. Compared to their share of GDP, Colombia’s use of the programme is low
(GDP share of 51.1 per cent), Peru’s use is high (GDP share of 33.1 per cent),
Ecuador’s use is about equal to its GDP (GDP share of 11.0 per cent), while Bolivia’s
use is low (GDP share of 4.9 per cent).
ATPA benefits are concentrated among four main product groups – copper, live trees
and plants (cut flowers), dyes and paints, and precious metals. Part C of Table 4 shows
the top five products. A large number of these top products are resource-based, either
agricultural products or metal- and mining-based products. Finally, overall imports in
nearly all the top product groups grew more than total US imports from these countries.12
Table 3
Trade performance under the Caribbean programmes
A. Imports from the 24 beneficiary eligible countries (millions of dollars)
Value Per cent change
1989 2000 2001 89-01 00-01
Total US imports 6,637 22,161 20,679 211.6 -6.7
of which:
CBERA, CBTPA, and GSP 1,331 2,994 8,478 536.9 183.1
CBERA imports 915 2,635 2,706 195.7 2.7
CBTPA imports 0 157 5,593 n.a. 3,462.3
GSP imports 416 202 179 -57.0 -11.5
Non-dutiable imports 3,455 14,139 15,089 336.7 6.7
of which:
CBERA, CBTPA, and GSP 1,331 2,710 7,941 496.6 193.0
CBERA imports 915 2,351 2,623 186.6 11.6
CBTPA imports 0 157 5,140 n.a. 3,173.5
GSP imports 416 202 179 -57.0 -11.5
B. Top Caribbean beneficiaries, 2001
Country Value Share
Dominican Republic 2,363 28.5
Honduras 1,671 20.1
Costa Rica 1,011 12.2
El Salvador 1,008 12.1
Trinidad 745 9.0
Guatemala 744 9.0
C. Top five Caribbean products, 2001
Commodity Value Share Per cent change
from 2000
Knitted apparel (HS 61) 2,936 35.4 0.6
Non-knitted apparel (HS 62) 2,257 27.2 -2.9
Mineral fuels and oils (petroleum) (HS 27) 436 5.3 -13.8
Edible fruit and nuts (HS 8) 332 4.0 -11.6
Electrical machinery and equipment (HS 85) 307 3.7 -1.8
Notes: Values are in millions of dollars. Imports are imports for consumption. In Panel C, per
cent change represents change in value of total imports, not just CBERA and CBTPA imports.
HS stands for Harmonized System, the international tariff code system.
Source: United States International Trade Commission (undated).13
Table 4
Trade performance under the Andean Trade Preference Act
A. Imports from the four beneficiary countries (millions of dollars)
1991 2001 Per cent change
Total US imports 4,969 9,569 92.5
of which:
ATPA and GSP 492 1,859 278.0
ATPA imports 0 1,675 n.a.
GSP imports 492 184 -62.5
Non-dutiable imports 2,599 5,770 122.0
of which:
Non-dutiable ATPA and GSP 492 1,836 273.5
Non-dutiable ATPA imports 0 1,652 n.a.
Non-dutiable GSP imports 492 184 -62.5






C. Top five Andean products, 2001
Commodity Value Share Per cent change
from 1991
Copper (HS 74) 440 26.3 728.3
Live trees and plants (cut flowers) (HS 6) 383 22.9 85.9
Dyes and paints (HS 32) 195 11.7 2,276.6
Pearls, gems, precious metals (HS 71) 153 9.1 -13.5
Vegetables (HS 7) 78 4.7 1,223.4
Values are in millions of dollars. Imports are imports for consumption. In Panel C, per cent
change represents change in value of total imports, not just AGOA imports. HS stands for
Harmonized System, the international tariff code system.
Source: United States International Trade Commission (undated).
AGOA, the newest regional preference programme, has given a tremendous boost to
duty-free trade from Africa, as shown in part A of Table 5. While GSP imports totalled
US$600 million from AGOA beneficiaries in 2001, down from US$704 million the year
before, AGOA imports totalled almost US$8.2 billion, making almost 50 per cent of all
imports from these countries duty-free. In contrast, the non-beneficiary countries saw
their non-dutiable imports fall by almost nine per cent from 2000 to 2001, largely
because of decreased US GSP imports.14
However, AGOA benefits are even more concentrated among countries and products
than are Caribbean or ATPA benefits, as shown in Parts B and C of Table 5. The two
top countries, Nigeria and Gabon, accounted for more than 87 per cent of all AGOA
imports, and only six of the 34 countries accounted for at least one per cent of AGOA
imports. The top product was crude petroleum, which accounted for 96.6 per cent of all
Nigeria AGOA exports and 100 per cent of all Gabon AGOA exports. Despite the
dominance of oil, AGOA has opened the way for apparel exports to the US. In 2000,
almost no apparel exports from AGOA beneficiaries were duty free. However, in 2001,
almost 38 per cent were duty free, almost entirely because of AGOA. Total AGOA-
beneficiary exports in these two categories rose 34.7 per cent between the two years.
Table 5
Trade performance under the African Growth and Opportunity Act
A. Imports from the 36 beneficiary eligible countries (millions of US dollars)
2000 2001 Per cent change
Beneficiary eligible countries (36)
Total US imports 18,321 17,573 -4.1
Non-dutiable imports 9,207 14,247 54.7
of which:
AGOA and GSP 704 8,179 1061.1
AGOA imports 0 7,579 n.a.
GSP imports 704 600 -14.8




South Africa 417 5.5
Lesotho 130 1.7
Republic of Congo 129 1.7
Madagascar 92 1.2
C. Top African products, 2001
Commodity Value Share Per cent change
from 2000
Mineral fuels and oils (petroleum) (HS 27) 6,827 90.1 -3.3
Vehicles (HS 87) 241 3.2 138.8
Knitted apparel (HS 62) 212 2.8 17.6
Non-knitted apparel (HS 61) 143 1.9 62.2
Iron and steel (HS 72) 79 1.0 -37.4
Values are in millions of dollars. Imports are imports for consumption. In Panel C, per cent
change represents change in value of total imports, not just AGOA imports. HS stands for
Harmonized System, the international tariff code system.
Countries in italics are currently UN-designated LDCs.
Source: United States International Trade Commission (undated).15
5 The implications of Triad LDC preferences
Triad preferences have done a great deal to expand exports from LDCs, yet lower
barriers have the potential to expand the demand for LDC goods even more. This
section provides estimates of the increase in LDC exports to Triad countries resulting
from unilateral preference programmes offered through 2000. These include the GSP
for all three Triad economies, CBERA for the US, and the ACP preferences for the
EU.27 Since the figures are based on 2000 trade and tariff data, they are an
understatement of the benefits to developing countries since preference programmes
have become more generous in the years since. However, they still provide a reasonable
indication of the impact of these programmes on LDC exports to Triad countries.
Following an assessment of the trade benefits derived from existing preferences, this
section then provides estimates of the increase in LDC exports to Triad economies that
would result from making the preferences comprehensive, or zeroing out all tariffs on
all imports from LDCs. This exercise shows the effects of eliminating the remaining
barriers. The largest benefits are projected to come from increased exports to the US,
though exports to the EU and Japan should also increase.
5.1 Methodology
The methodology used is closely related to that introduced in Haveman et al.
(forthcoming). In a framework of monopolistic competition, goods are differentiated
both by country of origin and by whether they are produced domestically or are
imported. For example, from the perspective of a US consumer, the degree of
differentiation between goods produced in Japan and an LDC is comparable to that
between goods from Japan and the EU, but the degree of differentiation between any of
these goods and those produced in the US the same. In essence, the model assumes that
imports from any pair of foreign countries are better substitutes for one another than
they are for domestically produced products.
The framework incorporates multiple tariff effects. The first, the trade-reduction effect,
provides a measure of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
This effect arises from the general increase in import prices that results from the
imposition of a tariff on goods from any or all countries. Consumers are assumed to
engage in two-stage budgeting. In the first stage, consumers allocate their expenditures
for each good to domestic and foreign purchases. As the price of imports rises,
expenditures allocated to imports fall for all imports of a particular good. This means
that the imposition of a tariff, whether on goods from one country or goods from all
countries, will reduce imports from all countries.
The second tariff effect is the tariff-diversion effect. This effect accounts for the
redistribution of expenditures away from imports from countries that face relatively
high tariffs, the second stage of the budgeting process. Once overall expenditures are
allocated between domestic and foreign purchases, they must be allocated across
varieties of imports. In the current context, this effect allows LDC tariff preferences to
increase LDC exports relative to exports from other countries. The tariff-diversion
                                                
27 The US ATPA includes no LDCs.16
effect is expected to be larger than the trade-reduction effect since the elasticity of
substitution between foreign sources is generally larger than that between domestically
produced goods and imports.
The results presented below are based on the analysis of highly detailed bilateral trade
data. Regressions are run separately on the imports of each Triad member. The unit of
observation for the dependent variable is a bilateral trade flow on a commodity basis
between the EU, the US, or Japan and a single foreign country.28 The analysis includes
imports from approximately 240 economies. Further, coefficient estimates are generated
independently for each 3-digit SIC industry. That is, the universe for each regression is
a single 3-digit 1987 US Standard Industrial Classification industry, made up of
individual observations on bilateral trade flows at the 6-digit Harmonized System level.
Different trade reduction and diversion effects are therefore estimated for each of 165
SIC groupings for each of the Triad members. These estimates are generated
independently of one another and are produced by a tobit regression framework that
permits the analysis to incorporate the informational content of the zero flow
observations in the data. The vast majority of bilateral trade observations at the 6-digit
HS level are zeros.
In addition to these variables, the regressions include year dummies, since the
observations include trade flows from multiple years: 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999 and
2000. Data for 1994 and 1997 are unavailable. Also included is a set of indicator
variables for the income level of the exporter, and GDP for the exporter crossed with
income level.29 The estimating equation also includes controls for distance between
importer and exporter, whether or not the same language is predominant in both
countries, and whether or not the countries share a land border, along with an indicator
for the presence of non-tariff barriers to trade or specific tariffs.
The estimating equation can be written as:
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where the dependent variable, ln h t j I M , , ,  is imports by country I from country j of
commodity h in year t. Here, I indicates one of: the US, the EU, or Japan, j is one of 240
potential exporters, t is one of the years listed above and h is a 6-digit HS product line
within a specific 3-digit SIC industry. TAUBAR is the trade-reduction effect, calculated
as the trade-weighted average tariff that country I imposes on imports of commodity h
                                                
28 Observations are excluded in the event that the importer does not import the item from any country or
the exporter does not export the item to any country.
29 Income levels are low income, lower-middle income, upper-middle income, and high income as
determined by the World Bank. Crossing GDP with income levels allows the influence of GDP on a
country’s export potential to vary across income categories. Results indicate that this specification is
preferred to one that holds the effect of GDP constant.17
from all countries in year t. TDIVER is the trade-diversion effect and is the difference
between the actual tariff imposed on imports by I from j of product h in year t and the
average tariff that country I imposes on all countries but j.30  1 β and 2 β  are expected to
be negative with  2 1 β β > .
Table 6 summarizes coefficient estimates and hence the trade reduction and diversion
effects that are estimated. US imports are both more sensitive to the imposition of tariffs
– the trade reduction effect is bigger – and the presence of preferences – the trade
diversion effect is bigger – than are imports to other Triad economies. Trade of the EU
is the least sensitive. This means that US trade contracts the most in response to the
imposition of a tariff, and more readily alters its pattern of imports in response to the
imposition of preferences. In each of the three Triad economies, the trade diversion
effect is larger than the trade reduction effect, which provides a simple check on the
validity of the coefficient estimates. Recall that the reduction effect is a direct indication
of the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced goods and foreign
products while the diversion effect is highly correlated with the elasticity of substitution
between foreign varieties. As was stated earlier, the latter effect is expected to be greater
than the former. As is common with regressions at this level of detail, the predicted sign
on the coefficient estimates of the control variables is not always obtained, but in all
cases the predicted sign is more common that is an incorrect sign.
Table 6
Summary of tariff effects on Triad trade
Mean coefficient estimates




The figures presented in Table 6 can be interpreted as follows. For the US, on average, a
one per cent increase in the average tariff imposed on imports reduces imports by 8.3
per cent. Further, a one per cent tariff preference leads to a 19.4 per cent increase in
trade for the exporter in question. These numbers are reasonably large, suggesting
significant benefits for LDCs from the unilateral preference programmes.
In the following subsections, the coefficient estimates are used to estimate first the
amount of LDC exports to Triad countries attributable to tariff preferences, and then to
forecast the increase in LDC exports that might result from the elimination of all tariffs
only on the imports of LDC products.
                                                
30 The detailed tariff data are drawn from extracts of the UNCTAD-TRAINS project. See
http://www.eiit.org/protection for more information.18
5.2 Estimating the trade implications of existing preferences
Triad preference programmes have provided large boosts to LDC exports. Table 7
provides both an indication of the importance of LDC trade in overall Triad imports and
an estimate of the increase in observed trade flows attributable to the existence of tariff
preferences. The first two columns of the table simply present actual data. The third and
fourth columns present counterfactual results generated from the coefficient estimates
presented above. The figures in Column 3 are predictions of the amount of trade that
would not have occurred were all beneficiaries of Triad unilateral preference
programmes subject to MFN tariffs.
Of the three members, the EU imports more from LDCs than do either of the others,
both in value terms and as a per cent of total trade. The US imports about half as much,
while Japan’s imports from LDCs are a distant third at less than US$1 billion.
Table 7



































Japan 234.2 0.8 0.3 65.1
The Triad’s LDC imports due to unilateral preferences follow a similar pattern. The EU
has experienced the largest effect, with trade increases of US$2.8 billion, followed by
the US, US$0.4 billion, and then Japan, at US$0.3 billion. However, as a per cent of
LDC imports, Japan’s programme does the most to expand trade, with preferences
increasing trade by 65 per cent. The EU programmes are in the middle, raising trade by
45 per cent, while US programmes have provided only a 10.5 per cent boost to imports
from LDCs.
This pattern of benefit reflects the design of the various programmes. The EU
programmes are deep and broad in the sense that all 2-digit HS sectors receive coverage
and preferences are generally extended to the vast majority of products within a sector.
Exceptions include some agricultural and food trade. The Japanese and US programmes
are likewise broad but significantly less deep, meaning that there are preferences in
most sectors, but that in most cases preferences do not extend to all products in each
sector.
                                                
31 Haiti is the only LDC affected by the CBERA programme.19
Also reflective of this pattern is the number of countries that benefit from the preference
schemes. The programmes of the EU and Japan provide benefits in excess of a 10 per
cent increase in exports to 26 and 25 countries, respectively. In fact, the EU
programmes are estimated to be responsible for a doubling of exports from seven
countries, while the Japanese programme is estimated to be responsible for a doubling
of exports from nine countries. For the EU, the seven include in descending order
Solomon Islands, Maldives, Lesotho, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, and Madagascar. Of
these, the Maldives, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Laos benefit only from the EU’s GSP
programme, not its ACP preferences. For Japan, the nine countries include in
descending order Mauritania, Gambia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Nepal, Bangladesh,
Solomon Islands, Madagascar, and Senegal.
The US programmes have lead to export increases of more than 10 per cent for only 15
countries, of which five experienced more than a doubling of exports as a result of these
programmes. These five included Togo, Burkina Faso, Benin, Angola, and Equatorial
Guinea. For the last two countries, imports were more than 40 times what they would
have been in the absence of preferences. There is no overlap between the top US
beneficiaries and the top EU and Japanese beneficiaries, but there is considerable
overlap between the EU and Japanese beneficiaries – Bangladesh, Cambodia,
Madagascar, and Solomon Islands.
Regarding commodities, approximately 70 per cent of the increase in total EU imports
from LDCs is in Textiles and Textile Products, the imports of which increase by about
136 per cent under the EU’s two preference programmes. The bulk of the increase in
Japanese imports – almost 68 per cent – is in the Animals and Animal Products sectors,
the imports of which almost triple due to the Japanese GSP. Almost half of the import
expansion for the US is in the Mineral Products sector, the imports of which more than
triple under the US preference programmes. About 29 per cent of the US expansion
comes in the Textiles and Textile Articles sector, but this represents only a 3.7 per cent
increase in the imports of these products.
The distribution and effect of preferences indicates why US imports from LDCs under
the preference programmes expand so little compared to EU or Japanese imports.
Although the US provides broad tariff preferences to LDCs – tariffs are eliminated on
48 per cent of the tariff lines with positive MFN tariffs – the goods for which a
preference is not granted are both the goods in which LDCs possess a strong
comparative advantage and goods with some of the highest applied tariffs. These are
primarily Textiles and Textile Products, including apparel.32 In contrast, the EU and
Japan have granted significant preferences in textiles and apparel, but have failed to
provide free access in their own sensitive sectors, those related to agricultural and
general food production. As a result, Vegetable Products imports increase very little in
both the EU and Japan under their preference programmes, though Animals and Animal
Products imports increase a great deal.
                                                
32 See Haveman and Shatz (2003) for more on the nature of the existing preferences programmes.20
5.3 Estimating the trade implications of the removal of existing preferences
While exports from LDCs have benefited a great deal from preferences, there is still
much room for trade liberalization, as recognized in the plans for the Doha Round of
multilateral trade negotiations. As of 2000, the US maintained significant barriers to
imports from LDCs, with an import weighted average tariff in excess of 5.3 per cent.
The remaining barriers in the EU and Japan were much lower, at 0.02 and 1.8 per cent,
respectively. As a result, the elimination of all tariffs on imports from LDCs by the
Triad members would be expected to expand exports the most for US partners and the
least for EU partners. Table 8 provides evidence.
While Table 7 reported the implications of restoring MFN tariffs to LDCs, Table 8
predicts the effects of eliminating the remaining tariffs on Triad imports of LDC goods.
Again, this is accomplished by applying the results of the regression analysis in
forecasting counterfactual trade flows for the year 2000.
Table 8




































Japan 234.2 0.8 0.6 69.3
The remaining tariffs on US imports from LDCs clearly pose the most significant
impediment to LDC exports. The projections indicate that LDC exports would have
been almost US$7 billion, or 148 per cent, higher in 2000 than was observed had the US
levied no tariffs on imports from LDCs. The remaining EU barriers on the other hand
are relatively few and their elimination would lead to a 2.6 per cent expansion in
imports from LDC countries. Japan represents the middle ground with a projected
increase in imports from LDCs of approximately 69 per cent. However, this represents
an increase in imports from LDCs of only US$0.6 billion.
More countries stand to benefit from the further elimination of tariffs by the US and
Japan than by the EU. For the US, 19 countries are projected to experience a 10 per cent
or greater expansion of exports, 12 of which would see exports more than double. The
same is roughly true for Japan with 21 countries expanding exports by more than 10 per
cent and with exports more than doubling for 10 of those countries. For the US, the
magnitudes are quite significant. The country experiencing the largest gain in value
terms is Bangladesh, for which exports could be expected to increase by US$4.0 billion,21
or 168 per cent. For Japan the largest gainer is Mauritania for which exports expand by
US$0.2 million, or 198 per cent.
The gains if the US and Japan were to institute zero-tariff regimes on LDC trade would
be even more broad-based than indicated above, because there is little overlap among
the top gainers. Only the Maldives is projected to more than double exports to both the
US and Japan, by 177 per cent to the former and 157 per cent to the latter.
Exporters to the EU could expect only modest gains, with just two countries, Senegal
and Sao Tome, experiencing double-digit growth. For both countries it is projected that
exports would have been almost 70 per cent higher had preferences been comprehensive
in 2000. Senegal is the largest gainer in value terms with exports projected to increase
by US$0.2 million, reflecting the fact that LDC exports form only a tiny portion of all
exports to the Triad economies.
By industry, exports to the US have been the most significantly hindered in the Textiles
and Textile Articles sector. Had preferences been comprehensive in 2000, US imports
of these products from LDCs would have been almost three times larger, increasing
from less to US$3.6 billion to almost US$9.9 billion. This expansion of US imports in
textiles and apparel accounts for approximately 90 per cent of the total export gains
from zeroing out tariffs on goods imported from LDCs. Other sectors growing
significantly include Footwear and Headgear, Prepared Foodstuffs, and Hides and
Skins, all of which are projected to grow more than 150 per cent.
For Japan, 80 per cent of the gains come in the Animals and Animal Products sector, in
part stemming from a projected 152 per cent increase in the imports of these products.
This sector is also responsible for most of the gains under Japan’s GSP as of 2000,
suggesting that while LDCs have gained important benefits already, barriers are still
high. While the Animals and Animal Products sector is the only one in which Japanese
imports would more than double, substantial gains also occur in imports of Mineral
Products (47 per cent), Wood Pulp and Products (31 per cent), and Textiles and Textile
Articles (12 per cent).
As in Japan, Animals and Animal Products imports would provide the bulk of the gains
– a little more than 61 per cent of the increase – in EU imports from LDCs. However,
EU imports from LDCs in this sector would increase by only 19 per cent, reflecting the
generous preferences already offered by the EU. Other industries that would experience
significant increases in imports are Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils (46 per cent) and
Prepared Foodstuffs (25 per cent), reflecting EU barriers to agriculture-based trade.
Although the current preference schemes do provide significant benefits to many LDCs,
these projections indicate that there are significant gains to be had from further
expansion of these programmes. Existing preferences have increased Triad imports
from LDCs to the tune of US$3.5 billion. However, this number is less than half the
LDC exports that could be had from totally freeing trade with LDCs. Should these
programmes be made comprehensive, exports from LDCs to Triad members would be
expected to grow by approximately US$7.6 billion, US$6.8 billion of which would be
destined for the US.22
6 Conclusions
Significant discussion took place between the time when the idea of a GSP-type
programme was introduced at UNCTAD I in 1964 and the passage of the enabling
clause in 1971 allowing such programmes to be GATT-legal. Those seven years of
work resulted in programmes that have had significant expansionary effects regarding
LDC exports as shown by the estimates of the previous section. Certainly the
programmes were not perfect. Benefits were concentrated among a minority of
countries, and difficult rules of origin and other procedures have kept many exporters
from taking advantage of the programmes.
One key difficulty with the GSP and other unilateral preference programmes has been
product coverage, and this was recognized in the WTO’s Singapore Ministerial in 1996.
Since then, the EU has gone a long way towards removing all tariff barriers against
LDC trade, while Japan has also increased benefits and the US has taken selective steps.
However, as the projections of this paper show, there are still large trade expansionary
gains to be had from fulfilling the Doha Ministerial goal of zero tariffs on all LDC
imports. This is especially true of US imports from LDCs.
Certainly this cannot solve all development issues. Within trade policy alone there are
still issues of rules of origin, capacity building, trade infrastructure, and LDC tariffs
limiting useful imports from the rest of the world. However, the elimination of barriers
should increase LDC exports a great deal. They will still remain a small portion of
overall trade however, limiting any disruptive effects they may have on the Triad
economies.
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